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REVIEWS
Justice Defiled: Perverts, Potheads, Serial Killers and 
Lawyers
Alan Young
Toronto: Key Porter Books Ltd, 2003 (337 pp.)
Reviewed by Michael Spratt† and Emilie Taman‡
I. INTRODUCTION
Alan Youngʼ’s Justice Defiled: Perverts, Potheads, Serial Killers and 
Lawyers is a self-styled celebration of legal vulgarity.1 In keeping with 
this theme, Young rejects conventional academic discourse, preferring 
instead the use of profane and often shocking language to convey his 
disgust with the state of the criminal law. Youngʼ’s use of language is 
not troubling in principle; to the contrary, the vulgarity of his language 
might have served to complement an otherwise persuasive argument. 
Unfortunately, however, many of Youngʼ’s arguments fall flat because 
they are not situated in a constructive analytical framework. 
Young explores two general themes in Justice Defiled, although a 
traditional thesis is more difficult to identify. He contends firstly that 
consensual acts which are harmless to everyone but the actor should not 
be prohibited by the criminal law. His secondary theme is that lawyers 
are part of a fundamentally flawed oligarchy whose self-interest drives 
them to perpetuate the status quo. The absence of a defined thesis results 
in a series of disjointed criticisms of the legal profession lacking the 
† Michael Spratt is a third year law student at Dalhousie University. In light of his interest in 
criminal law, he will be articling with a criminal defence firm in Toronto next year.
‡ Emilie Taman is also in third year law at Dalhousie Law School. She will be clerking with the 
Ontario Court of Appeal next year.
1 A. Young, Justice Defiled: Perverts, Potheads, Serial Killers and Lawyers, (Toronto: Key 
Porter Books Ltd., 2003).
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necessary academic stamina needed to act as an effective impetus for 
institutional reform.
The timing of this review is fortuitous as it coincides with the re-
lease of the Supreme Court of Canadaʼ’s decision in R. v. Malmo-Levine.2 
This case raised one of the two issues that troubles Young: the criminal 
prohibition of activities that cause no harm to the actor, an identifiable 
victim, or society at large.3 The majority decision and the main dissent 
by Justice Arbour explore whether there is a “harm principle,” based on 
the theories of John Stuart Mill, which underlies the criminal law. The 
majority rejects the argument that harm, as a pre-requisite to criminal 
sanction, is a legal principle so fundamental to our notion of justice as to 
enjoy the constitutional protection of section 7 of the Charter of Rights 
and Freedoms.4 However, the majority nonetheless accepts that there 
is a legitimate State interest in prohibiting only those acts that cause 
harm to others. Justice Arbour, on the other hand, argues that where an 
offence carries with it the possibility of imprisonment, section 7 of the 
Charter will be unjustifiably infringed where it cannot be demonstrated 
that the prohibited act causes harm.
While Young argues that only truly harmful acts should be prohib-
ited, he does not explore the idea that harm may be a constitutional 
prerequisite to criminal sanction. Indeed, there is no cogent legal theory 
forming the basis of his argument which could reflect, at least in part, 
his disdain for the law. Instead of using harm or some other principle 
to argue that the State cannot legislate with respect to certain harm-
less crimes, Young often slips into highly emotional and reactionary 
arguments as to why the State should not criminalize harmless moral 
choices. These arguments, although thought-provoking, do not provide 
the “conventionally moral” reader with a sound legal justification for 
why others should be able to make such choices without engaging the 
criminal law.
Young characterizes Justice Defiled as an attack on the legal profes-
sion – a profession which is, in his view, largely hypocritical, corrupt 
and apathetic. He blames the lawyers for perpetuating the status quo by 
blindly applying laws they know to be unfair or which they choose not 
2 R. v. Malmo-Levine, 2003 SCC 74 [Malmo-Levine].
3 At issue in Malmo-Levine was possession of marijuana.
4 Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Sched-
ule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11 [the “Charter”].
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to follow in their own lives. Why he blames the profession exclusively, 
and not Parliament, for the existence of so many “morally hygienic” 
crimes is unclear. Some incarnation of the harm principle, as discussed 
in Malmo-Levine, would have provided Young with a more construc-
tive vehicle to promote the changes to the justice system he believes 
are necessary. The use of a principled argument may not be the most 
shocking or awe-inspiring impetus for reform, but it does stand up to 
academic scrutiny in a way that Justice Defiled–though passionate and 
ambitious–does not. 
II. JUSTICE DEFILED
Justice Defiled is divided into four parts. In the first, “Entering the Are-
na,” Young explores his conclusion that the legal profession is a social 
cancer. The second part, “Sex, Drugs and the Illegality of Paradise,” 
examines how the criminal justice system wastes time combating con-
sensual lifestyle decisions that do not threaten the fabric of society. In 
the third part, “Victims, Violence and the Beast,” Young submits that 
the lawʼ’s preoccupation with moral hygiene and other trivialities has 
left the criminal justice system ill-equipped to deal with serious issues 
of violence and exploitation. Finally, in “Legal Professionals as Fallen 
Priests,” Young attempts to show that the nature of an adversarial legal 
culture breeds arrogance, elitism and a captious spirit.
III. ENTERING THE ARENA
This first part of Justice Defiled lays out Youngʼ’s contention that law-
yers are a cancer. As law students, the authors of this review are nearing 
the completion of what Young would refer to as our transformation into 
a privileged and oppressive class. In casting lawyers as a cancer, blindly 
applying oppressive laws, Young writes: “I donʼ’t need a control group 
to show that most law students are in it for the money. I see it in their 
eyes,” and “the ʻ‘law as oppressionʼ’ rant is so well known I donʼ’t have 
the academic strength to recount it.”5 These statements illustrate a major 
5 Supra note 1 at 3.
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flaw that permeates much of Youngʼ’s analysis: lack of authority. One 
does not need to be a member of a privileged group to understand that 
broad, sweeping statements of fact should not be made authoritatively 
in the absence of some form of substantiation. 
Nonetheless, buried in the rhetoric that permeates this section is a 
grain of academic gold, a statement that if expanded upon could have 
provided the analytical framework Justice Defiled is in desperate need 
of. This is Youngʼ’s statement that the criminal law should only target 
behaviour that is harmful to others.6 This statement, however, is made 
somewhat in passing, and is not elaborated or drawn on as a legal justi-
fication for the decriminalization of certain crimes.
Young begins the second chapter of this section with an anecdote 
about a sexually frustrated man named Homer and his quest for sexual 
gratification that falls short of actual intercourse. Young uses this as an 
example of the criminal lawʼ’s misuse of resources combating social is-
sues that are not inherently “criminal.” In other words, the criminal law 
should only be engaged, in Youngʼ’s view, to regulate activity that causes 
harm to third parties or society at large. Young contends that prostitution 
and escort laws target behaviour that does not harm anyone, and that 
the current criminal law sanctions amount to little more than a licens-
ing fee. While Young acknowledges that women who are coerced into 
prostitution through physical abuse or who enter the trade to fuel drug 
addiction are harmed, he contends that these harms are consequent to 
the criminalization of the sex trade. 
This statement is an example of Youngʼ’s typical response to the con-
trary argument that the trade in drugs and sex and other so-called moral 
crimes are inherently harmful. Young may be right that the effect of 
criminalization is often the transformation of otherwise harmless activi-
ties into dangerous ones–this premise is certainly worth exploring–but 
little analysis of any kind is provided on the issue. Further, Young is 
often quick to point out flaws in the criminal justice system while of-
fering few solutions. He often argues that offences should be taken out 
of the Criminal Code while simultaneously recognizing that an alterna-
tive form of non-criminal regulation may be justified. Justice Defiled 
does not provide an exit strategy or alternative regulation mechanism to 
6 Supra note 1 at 12.
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replace the present regime of criminalization. Without a coherent exit 
strategy, the removal of “harmless” activities from the Criminal Code 
may, in fact, cause more harm than good in the short term.
In the final chapter of Part I, the reader is subjected to the first of 
Youngʼ’s disjointed musings about the criminal justice system. His main 
criticism in this chapter is that the criminal law is too concerned with 
what he calls the “where, what, who and when” aspects of crime, but 
not the “why.” Young uses the extreme example of murderer and serial-
rapist Paul Bernardo to illustrate this point. He argues that millions of 
dollars were wasted in the Bernardo trial to prove something we already 
knew: that Bernardo was guilty.7 Young suggests that the money spent 
on Bernardoʼ’s trial could have been better spent seeking to understand 
why Bernardo had committed such horrible crimes. On the facts of the 
Bernardo case, where the Crown had videotapes depicting Mr. Bernardo 
committing the offences, it is possible to see how a reader would agree 
that resources were wasted. However, would the alternative be any 
more compelling? It is unlikely that Young would advocate for a system 
providing for the discretionary denial of trials where the Crown or the 
police believed that a trial is unwarranted. Young does not include the 
section on Bernardo to demonstrate a need for criminal justice reform 
but rather to advance his “lawyers are scum” position. He concludes 
the section by arguing that the only people who benefited from the Ber-
nardo trial were the lawyers. Contrary to what the section on Bernardo 
suggests, a fair trial and the legitimacy it brings to the system benefits 
all accused persons and the entire criminal justice process. This is true 
even where the accusedʼ’s guilt is near certain.
IV. SEX, DRUGS AND THE ILLEGALITY OF PARADISE
In this second part of Justice Defiled, Young argues for the decriminali-
zation of a number of specific offences that he views as harmless. He 
considers such offences to be within the range of reasonable consensual 
lifestyle choices that should be available to Canadians. In particular, 
Young is critical of sex-trade laws and the prohibitions against the pur-
chase and sale of drugs such as marijuana and heroin.
7	
    Supra note 1 at 26.
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With respect to crimes of a sexual nature, Young sees consent as 
the only legitimate limiting factor. He argues that adults should be le-
gally permitted to consent to whatever sexual activity they choose, in 
the place and under the circumstances they desire, and with the partner 
or partners of their choice.8 This is not an unreasonable position to take. 
Indeed, Young is not the first to argue that “the State has no place in the 
bedrooms of the nation.”9 However, he takes a very superficial view of 
consent in advancing his position that only a minute number of sex-
based crimes are the legitimate subjects of the criminal law. A more 
in-depth analysis of the relationship between consent and lack of harm 
would better serve to situate this valuable section in a larger analytical 
framework, providing both legitimacy and academic fortitude to this 
otherwise important argument. 
Despite the shortcomings of the chapter dedicated to sex-trade laws, 
Young moves on to provide significant empirical evidence in support of 
his view that marijuana is harmless to both its users and society at large. 
With respect to marijuana use, some of the evidence upon which he 
relies was accepted by the Supreme Court of Canada in R. v. Clay,10 the 
companion case to Malmo-Levine, with which Mr. Young was involved. 
However, Youngʼ’s tendency to overreach is once again exposed in this 
section. 
After having built a solid evidentiary foundation with respect to 
marijuana use, Young goes on to make the bald and unsupported asser-
tion that heroin is as harmless as marijuana if used with care, planning 
and prudence, and that in most case quitting cold-turkey is no worse 
than getting the flu. Young presents very little evidence to this effect, but 
indicates that “studies abound” providing the relative numbers of indi-
viduals who are likely to be overwhelmed by their given vice. He states 
he is unaware of “any study indicating that more than twenty percent of 
users or participants in any vice activity lose control over their lives.”11 
On that basis he concludes that no more than twenty percent of heroin 
8 It is of interesting note that while Young takes great offence to crimes rooted in concepts of 
personal morality, he writes the following about the offence of bestiality: “If you consider this a 
serious deprivation of freedom, then you are actually too sick for me to even defend.”
9 Pierre Elliot Trudeau, December 22, 1967, discussing amendments to the Criminal Code to 
liberalize laws relating to abortion and homosexuality.
10 R v Clay, [2003] SCC 75.
11Supra note 1 at 111[emphasis added].
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users are at risk of causing harm to others. This is an absurd inference, 
and even if it were legitimate, a one in five chance of harm is hardly 
insignificant. Further, Young does not address the fact that heroin is ad-
dictive and that this will often negate the planning and prudence which 
he insists will usually curtail the potentially harmful effects of its use. 
In Youngʼ’s desire to be sensational, a legitimate legal argument for the 
decriminalization of marijuana is grossly undermined by his unreasoned 
claims about heroin. 
Young draws on his earlier arguments about the hypocrisy of law-
yers by alluding to the number of practicing lawyers who use drugs 
themselves. This is another example of an argument that may evoke the 
kind of response Young seems to crave, but it does little to advance any 
meaningful thesis. If criminal defence lawyers represented only those 
defendants with whom they morally agreed, or if prosecutors refused 
to enforce laws with which they disagreed, the criminal justice system 
would become unworkable.
Young goes on to make an interesting point about the exorbitant 
economic cost of enforcing laws that prohibit harmless acts. Even dis-
counting the more controversial activities such as heroin-use, the pros-
ecution of offences relating to harmless acts such as consensual sex or 
marijuana-use consumes vast quantities of resources. Young argues that 
the police suffer from a financial and public relations addiction to the 
enforcement of marijuana laws. Unfortunately, this intriguing theory, 
like Youngʼ’s arguments about the decriminalization of marijuana, is at 
risk of being lost in a sea of rhetoric. Young should have devoted more 
time to the more weighty arguments laid out in this part of Justice De-
filed before moving on to the third part, where he again deviates from 
the harm principle and returns to an unfocused critique of the criminal 
justice system.
V. VICTIMS, VIOLENCE AND THE BEAST 
Here Young takes a shotgun approach to the critique of current criminal 
law policy. First he explores the reasons why we punish. Young exam-
ines the deontological and utilitarian approaches to punishment, view-
ing the criminal law as a form of social contract between society and 
the State, and questions the utility of punishing individuals who have 
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derived little personal benefit from the criminal law. He questions, for 
example, the justice in convicting an individual of assault who has en-
dured a lifetime of abuse. Again however, Young offers little in the way 
of answers or solutions .
Young then takes on the verbosity of the Criminal Code.12 He right-
ly points out that the Code is confusing, repetitive and ambiguous. No 
doubt, the removal of the numerous incarnations of the crime of theft,13 
for example, would make the Criminal Code more accessible to Canadi-
ans. Furthermore, the removal of offences that cause no harm to others 
would make the Code fairer. However, rather than rooting his concerns 
about the Code in notions such as accessibility or justice, Young reverts 
to sensationalism, suggesting that it is ambiguous because ambiguity 
leads to inflated profits for lawyers. This might appeal to an already 
jaded public, but it does little to advance a persuasive justification for 
legal reform.
Young then revisits his earlier argument that the decriminalization of 
harmless offences would save the justice system money and free up re-
sources that could be directed toward truly harmful acts. This argument 
is appealing on its face, and we agree that reform in this area is needed. 
Young does not, however, address the cost of delegating these harm-
less offences to a regulatory board or tribunal. It is quite possible that 
a parallel but non-criminal regulatory scheme would be equally costly. 
The criticism of crimes on the basis of their economic cost is likely to 
have wide-spread appeal. Yet given that it is not clear that the alterna-
tive would be any more cost-effective, by rooting this argument in an 
analytical concept, such as harm, Young could have made an equally 
compelling argument on the basis of social rather than economic costs. 
VI. LEGAL PROFESSIONALS AS FALLEN PRIESTS
In this final part of Justice Defiled, Young abandons completely the idea 
of harm and reverts back to an attack on the legal profession as a whole. 
The closing chapters of the book focus mainly on legal education and 
the nature of the adversarial system. This part appears to be a popu-
12 Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46 [the “Code”].
13 See e.g. Criminal Code, ibid at s. 322 (theft), s. 323 (theft from an oyster bed), s. 338 (theft of 
cattle), s. 339 (theft of drift timber).
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larized attack on lawyers, designed to rekindle readersʼ’ enthusiasm in 
order to bring them on side as the book comes to a close. As law stu-
dents, our experience leads us to think that Youngʼ’s criticisms of the le-
gal education system are overly simplistic and often grossly unfair. Pro 
bono, legal aid and the promotion of “alternative” careers are a promi-
nent feature of legal education at Dalhousie and many other law schools 
across Canada. This may be a reflection of student initiative as opposed 
to institutional foresight, but the students with whom we have come in 
contact are moral, ethical, socially progressive, and lack the adversarial 
mean-streak that Young seems to be familiar with. 
VII. CONCLUSION
Justice Defiled is a timely and interesting general critique of the crimi-
nal justice system. Youngʼ’s use of colourful language and personal an-
ecdotes is highly effective at evoking an emotional response from the 
reader. With a little more focus and less sensationalism, Youngʼ’s ideas 
might have transcended purely emotional responses and given rise to a 
persuasive justification for reform. Unfortunately, as it stands, Justice 
Defiled caters more to those who are already of a like mind with the 
author.  The legal profession in Canada is not bereft of those who would 
be amenable to criminal justice reform that could lead to an accessible, 
minimally intrusive, just system that Young seeks. Through his choice 
of tone and style, however, Young risks undermining the movement for 
reform. This book, lacking as it is in academic rigor, may well alien-
ate legal academics and others who are in a position to effect change. 
Without the offer of concrete ways to implement the change he seeks, 
Youngʼ’s sensationalistic tendencies may simply serve to reinforce the 
status quo, rather than bringing us closer to the ideal.
